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In recent years, two areas of international law have particularly developed: human 
rights law and international criminal law. Whereas traditionally human rights law has 
developed based on notions such as fair trial and on the rights of the accused, recently 
the focus has shifted towards the needs to prosecute person responsible of gross 
violations of human rights such genocide, crime against humanity or war crimes. In 
this „weeding‟ between human rights law and international criminal law one of the 
main questions is concerned with finding the right balance between prosecution and 
defence in order to ensure that the international justice remains based on the ideal of 
reconciliation and not revenge. At the international level the debates relating to the 
grounds to exclude the criminal responsibility of the accused were intense during the 
Rome Conference for the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Rome Statute).
1
 Because the crimes, which are under the jurisdiction of this Court, 
are of the most heinous nature, the question of the possibility of invoking defences for 
such crimes was certain to be one of the difficult issues to arise during the discussions. 
The issue was especially tense as the Conference involved bringing together many 
different national criminal law perspectives for the same international statute. There 
are wide differences between the questions of the defences in all the different national 
jurisdictions. The difficulty was to „harmonize‟ these different approaches, knowing 
that the ICC is unique by its universality and permanence. Thus, the Rome Statute 
accomplished the challenge in a short period of time, in bringing together the 
continental-European system and the common-law approaches to defences. Article 31 
of the Rome Statute uses the term „grounds to exclude criminal responsibility‟; a term 
that is broad enough to accommodate the different legal traditions. In exploring the 
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defences as set up in article 31 of the Statute, this article has two main purposes. First, 
to appreciate whether the Rome Statute represents a codification of existing laws or an 
evolution of the ground to exclude criminal responsibility in international law. To this 
purpose, this article analyses the relevant sources and content of international criminal 
law, thus explores the defences of insanity, intoxication, self-defence and duress as 
recognised in article 31 of the Statute. Secondly, this paper is aimed at scrutinising the 
confusion that has been raised concerning such grounds of exclusion in cases of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. One of the issues during the Rome 
Conference was to define what sort of defences would be acceptable in the Statute to 
exclude the criminal responsibility of person who by definition would be responsible 
for the „most horrible crimes‟. There has been much confusion between defences and 
negation of responsibility. The present article seeks to highlight that the recognition of 
grounds to exclude criminal responsibility and the negation of crimes are two different 
notions. Overall, the purpose is to show that allowing defences based on the 
recognition of the „human fragility‟ within the Statute does not mean the ignorance of 
the horrible character of the crimes. It is not because the ICC deals with the most 
heinous crimes, that persons accused must be recognised culpable with no possibility 
to prove that their intention was not criminal. Ultimately, a different view would be 
contrary to the evolution of criminal law and human rights law.  
 
I. A Long Way to Rome 
 
The first international war crimes tribunal established by the Nuremberg Charter 
provided that the accused have “the right to give any explanation relevant to the 
charges made against him”.2 Nevertheless, the Charter did not give any definition or 
list of the defences permissible. The only exception was with regard to the defence of 
superior orders.
3
 Control Council Law No. 10 also dealt solely with the defence of 
superior order.
4
 In terms of the jurisprudence, the Law Reports of Trials of War 
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Criminals points out that most of the pleas before war crimes tribunal include three 
categories of arguments. The argument that the accused acted under superior orders 
(plea of superior orders), the argument that the accused acted under a threat to himself 
(plea of duress), and the argument that the crime was for the accomplishment of a 
military mission (plea of military necessity).
5
 The 1949 Geneva Conventions make no 
reference to specific defences in case of war crimes.
6
 The 1948 Genocide Convention 
includes only one provision relating to the defence of head of State immunity and 
declares it to be inadmissible.
7
 The Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and the 
Security of Mankind of the International Law Commission states that the Court shall 
determine the admissibility of the defences “in accordance with the general principles 
of law, in the light of the character of each crime.”8 The Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
9
 only mentioned „military 
necessity‟ as a ground of justification10 and „superior orders‟ as a ground of 
mitigation.
11
 Thus, the first issue in Rome was to answer the question: should the ICC 
statute mention specific grounds to exclude criminal responsibility?  
 
During the Rome Conference there was a clear will to codify as much as possible the 
international criminal law within the Rome Statute, it was clear that most of the States 
did not want to leave as much liberty as the Statute of the ICTY did to the judges. The 
1995 Ad Hoc Committee divided defences into three categories: negation of liability, 
excuses and justifications and defences under public international law. It was only in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
order of his government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be 
considered in mitigation.” 
5
 Law Report of trials of War Criminals, Vol. XIV, XV, London, Published for the United-Nations War  
Crimes Commissions by his majesty‟s stationery office, 1949, p.156; The Rome Statute distinguishes 
the plea of superiors order but amalgamates the two other pleas in the same category, as the plea of 
military necessity is included in the defence of self-defence (see discussion below) 
6
 Geneva Conventions, Adopted on 12 August 1949 by the Diplomatic Conference for the 
Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, held in Geneva from 
21 April to 12 August, 1949 
7
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 4, (1951) 78 UNTS 
277. 
8
 See: Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1  
9
 The full appellation of the Tribunal is: „International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991‟, see: Security Council Resolution, UN Doc. S/RES/827, Adopted 
25 May 1993. 
10
 „Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia‟, Article 2 (d) and 3 (b) 
11
 Id, Article 7. 
 4 
December 1997 that the Preparatory Committee had titled a general provision 
„grounds for excluding criminal responsibility‟. 12   
 
A large part of the drafting debates focused on the question of the inscription of the 
defences as possible factors of mitigation or of exclusion of responsibility. Amnesty 
International advocated a clear-cut distinction between the two notions; duress or 
superior orders would have been mitigating factors only.
13
 The non-governmental 
organisation affirmed that under international law there was a precedent for the 
exclusion of a codification of specific defences regarding the gravity of the offences. 
One of the major issues was to appreciate whether defences should be regarded as a 
justification or excuse.
14
  A defence could be seen either as justifying acts that would 
have been criminal (justification) or as excusing the accused that have acted 
criminally (excuses). The Rome Statute favours the approach that defences could acts 
as grounds for excluding the criminal responsibility. In its article 31, the Rome Statute 
puts together defences such as self-defence, which is usually regarded as a 
justification, and intoxication or insanity, which are usually classified as excuses. The 
association of such different defences is based on the idea that all are linked with the 
issue of  mens rea. All existing international or national crimes have two constitutive 
elements: the criminal act by itself (actus reus) and the criminal intent (mens rea). 
Insanity or intoxication involve the incapacity to appreciate the unlawfulness of the 
act. Self-defence excludes the criminal intention, as the intention was to protect life. 
The consequence of duress is the suppression of the freedom of choice of the person, 
thus related to the mens rea of the author. In the Statute, even though the judges of the 
ICC have the power to refer to these defences as mitigating factors when sentencing 
the accused,
15
 all these defences are potentially “absolute defences”,16 or in other 
terms „complete defences‟ which may allow the judges to find the accused non-
culpable.  
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II. INSANITY and INTOXICATION 
 
Defences based on insanity or intoxication are clearly linked with the question of the 
mens rea of the accused at the moment of the crime. Rather than relating to the 
criminal intent, such defences relate much more to the criminal consciousness. The 
author was not conscious of his/her act. The Rome Statute states that mental disease 
or intoxication have destroyed the person‟s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or 
nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform the 
requirement of law. 
 
A. Insanity 
 
Both systems, common-law
17
 and civil law systems have recognised a defence based 
on insanity as a complete defence when the total insanity of the accused is proven. 
The test to prove insanity defined by the American Institute has been adopted by a 
large number of states, this test adopted by the Model Penal Code states: 
 
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such 
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
18
 
 
In 2001, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY dealt with the defence of insanity in the 
Celebici case, in which the judges made reference to the ICC statute. In this case, one 
of the four accused, Esad Landzo invoked a defence based on his “diminished mental 
responsibility”.19 The judges rejected his defence and sentenced him to fifteen years of 
imprisonment. The Trial Chamber found him guilty of grave breaches of the Geneva 
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Conventions. The accused filed one ground of appeal directed to the issue of 
„diminished mental responsibility‟; a defence that can be found in the ICTY rules of 
procedure and evidence. The accused argued that “the refusal of the Trial Chamber to 
define the „special defence‟ in advance of evidence being given in relation to it denied 
him a fair trial.”20 The Appeals Chamber pointed out that Article 15 of the ICTY 
Statute gives power to the judges to adopt „rules of procedure and evidence‟, thus no 
power to adopt new defences as such, and that therefore, the accused‟s claim that the 
Statute makes reference to such defence of diminished mental responsibility was 
unfounded.  
 
Based on customary international law, the Appeals Chamber notably highlighted that 
the defence based on diminished mental responsibility was clearly different from the 
defence of insanity included in the ICC Statute. The defence of insanity refers to the 
destruction of the defendant‟s capacity and such annihilation would leads to an 
acquittal, whereas the defence of diminished mental capacity refers only to the 
impairment of mental capacity. Such a defence could be relevant only in the matter of 
mitigation of a sentence. On this point, the Appeals Chamber followed the decision of 
the Trial Chamber that the accused “was quite capable of controlling his action” and 
thus rejected his appeal. Thus, in invoking the defence of insanity the defence must 
demonstrate that the accused was unable to control his or her action at the moment of 
the illegal act. To be an acceptable defence the mental disease or defect must have 
completely destroyed the mental capacity of the accused. One can regret that the 
Rome Statute does not address the situation of the accused that would be found 
insane. On this issue, Amnesty International have highlighted that “the Statute or rules 
will have to establish procedures consistent with international law and standards for 
addressing the situation of a person acquitted on this ground who continues to suffer 
from that disease or defect.”21  Thus, whereas most national systems organise a 
procedure for addressing the situation of the person acquitted because of insanity, the 
Rome Statute remains silent on this issue. 
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 B. Intoxication 
 
The state of intoxication refers to situations where the accused by reason of 
consuming drugs or alcohol was unable to have “the normal use of his physical or 
mental faculties, thus rendering him incapable of acting in the manner in which an 
ordinarily prudent and cautious man, in full possession of his faculties, using 
reasonable care, would act under like conditions.”22 At Rome, a large part of the 
debates focused on the issue of voluntary intoxication. In the past, the British Military 
Court in the case of Yamamoto Chusaburo had recognized that intoxication was an 
admissible defence in case of war crimes.
23
 However, in this case, while the accused 
pleaded the defence of drunkenness the Court rejected such a defence on the ground 
that the intoxication was voluntary. The issue of voluntary or involuntary intoxication 
is linked with the question of the intent of the author. In cases of voluntary 
intoxication it is possible to support the idea that the accused has had a pre-existing 
intent, or that he knew that the circumstances that led to the crime could arise. During 
the debates for the establishment of the ICC statute, the Working Group pointed out 
that:  
 
Some delegations have doubts about accepting voluntary intoxication as a 
ground for excluding criminal responsibility. It was the understanding that 
voluntary intoxication as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility 
would generally not apply in case of genocide or crimes against humanity, 
but might apply to isolated acts constituting war crimes. One delegation was 
of the view that one should not differentiate between types of crimes.
24
  
 
The Rome Statute includes such a distinction, as article 31 paragraph 1 (b) states that 
intoxication is a complete defence “unless the person has become voluntarily 
intoxicated under such circumstances that the person knew, or disregarded the risk, 
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that, as a result of the intoxication, he or she was likely to engage in conduct 
constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.” Thus, in case of voluntarily 
intoxication this defence is excluded only if the accused knew, or disregarded the risk 
that he or she was likely to commit. 
 
III. SELF-DEFENCE 
 
In international law the notion of self-defence tended to apply only to inter-states 
relationships. Vattel has made the point that for states self-defence is not only a right 
but also one of the most sacred duties of the state. Nowadays, the right to self-defence 
for states is part of both customary and conventional international law.
25
 Nevertheless, 
such a right to „self-protection‟ is conceded to the State under attack and not to the 
individual facing a charge of war crimes before a court. Thus, such a defence might be 
recognised for the soldier only in a derivative manner. The Rome Statute clearly 
makes the difference between the two notions of individual and state self-defence. 
Article 31 (c) reads: “The fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation 
conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal 
responsibility under this subparagraph”. Therefore, even though the state is engaged in 
a self-defence action, the person involved in such an operation cannot claim that 
he/she was acting in self-defence.  
 
In criminal law, self-defence is a frequently recognised defence. In the history of 
criminal law such a right to self-defence was justified by the urgency of the situation, 
usually laws authorised the victim to protect themselves. This right was to protect 
another right that was threatened. In such cases public authorities transfer a power 
which is usually only rightfully exercise by those authorities. Today such a defence is 
recognized in both common law and civil law. Internationally, the Tokyo tribunal has 
highlighted that: “[A]ny law, international or municipal which prohibits recourse to 
force, is necessarily limited by the right of self-defence”.26 During the trial of Willi 
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Tessmann and others by the British Military Court in Hamburg in 1947, the Judge 
Advocate stated:  
 
The law permits a man to save his own life by despatching that of another, 
but it must be in the last resort. He is expected to retreat to the uttermost 
before turning and killing his assailant; and of course, such considerations as 
the nature of the weapon in the hands of the accused, the question whether 
the assailant had any weapon and so forth, have to be considered. In other 
words, was it a last resort? Had he retreated to the uttermost before ending 
the life of another human being?
27
 
 
However, it is worth noting that few accused had successfully pleaded self-defence in 
cases tried following the Second World War.
28
 Article 2 (2) (a) of the European 
Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also 
recognises self-defence as a derogation from the obligation of the right to life.
29
 
Recently, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY has stated that the defence of self-defence 
“may be regarded as constituting a rule of customary international law.”30 Article 31 
paragraph 1 (c) of the Rome Statute introduces the right to self-defence as follows:  
 
The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person or, 
in case of war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the 
person or another person, or property, which is essential for accomplishing a 
military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner 
proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or 
property protected. The fact that the person was involved in a defensive 
operation conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for 
excluding criminal responsibility under this subparagraph. 
 
There are three categories of requirement in the plea of self-defence: 
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(1) the person must have acted „reasonably‟ 
(2)  in response to an „imminent and unlawful use of force‟  
(3) and this act must have been „proportionate to the degree of danger‟.  
The person that claims to have acted under self-defence must have done so 
„reasonably‟. Such a notion refers to the reasonability of the act during the 
circumstances of the case; the accused must have reasonably believed that the use of 
force and thus the criminal act was necessary to defend himself or someone else. The 
court would appreciate the perception of the danger of the accused and to what extent 
the threat was real at the moment of the act. In highlighting that the framing of the 
„Model Penal Code‟ contains nearly the same definition of self-defence as the ICC 
Statute, Bassiouni emphasised that requirement that the defender reasonably believe 
that forceful response is necessary is a common law requirement which is superfluous 
for civil law systems. The requirement that the response must be to an imminent and 
unlawful use of force “may be viewed under the common law as surplusage.”31 In this 
regard, the Rome Statute established a balance between the common-law requirement 
and that of the civil law system.  
 
The second requirement that the accused must have acted in reaction to an “imminent 
and unlawful use of force” can be explained by the fact that the response to the danger 
must have followed the unlawful use of force. If it is not the case that the accused had 
responded to such a use of force by another person, it is no longer a case of self-
defence but one of assault.  
 
The third condition is classical and can be found in most of the national criminal 
systems, the force used to respond to the attack must be proportionate to such an 
attack. If the response is superior to the degree of danger, such response is no longer 
justified and regains its illegal character. It is not the result of the act of the defence 
that will be taken in consideration but rather the intention of the accused. The Rome 
Statute distinguishes different situations. For all the crimes that might fall under the 
competence of the ICC the accused might have acted to protect his life or another life. 
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In cases of war crimes solely, the person might have act to protect „property which is 
essential for accomplishing military mission.‟ This aspect of the definition of self-
defence in the ICC Statute is open to much criticism.
32
  
 
Even though there is no international consensus concerning the invocation of self-
defence for the protection of property, the Rome Statute recognizes such a possibility 
in case of war crimes. This defence can only be invoked for the protection of property 
which is essential for life or for the accomplishment of a military mission. However, it 
is quite difficult to imagine what kind of property might justify the perpetration of a 
war crime in a „proportionate‟ way. Even though such a defence is „only‟ available in 
case of war crimes, such war crimes involve for example torture, use of poisoned 
weapons or attacking or bombarding towns, village, etc.
33
 David argued that this 
provision is “a Pandora‟s box that is rigorously incompatible with the law of armed 
conflict.”34 It is fully human and understandable that law would justify the preference 
given to life rather than to property, the opposite seems unacceptable. Thus, it is quite 
difficult to comprehend in what situation the defence of property might be an 
acceptable defence for war crimes. However, such an inclusion should not be of much 
concern as the conditions that frame the defence of self-defence are strict and judges 
would certainly not allow such a defence in many cases. In this regard, this reference 
to property must be seen as one of the most scandalous concession of a multinational 
conference where the most important thing was finally to arrive at a consensus.   
 
Under Article 31 (c), the Statute recognises self-defence for a person who „acts 
reasonably‟ to defend a property that is „essential for accomplishing a military 
mission.‟  Even though the defendant would have to respect legal methods of combat, 
a priori such a position includes the idea that „the end justifies the means‟; for 
military objectives any act necessary for the victory might be a way of defence. 
Concerning this part of the Rome Statute, Cassese has highlighted that “this 
extension is manifestly outside lex lata, and may generate quite few misgivings.”35 
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The origin of the concept of military necessity can be found in the Lieber Code of 
1863, and such a Code used that concept only to restrain military operations, not as a 
defence to war crimes.
36
 This defence does not extend to the deliberate killing of 
civilians, as it this an action that is never justified.
37
 Article 48 of Protocol I of the 
Geneva Convention states: “Parties to the conflict shall at all the times distinguish 
between the civilian population and the combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.”38 The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal recognised the defence based 
on the military necessity.
39
 Article 2 (d) of the ICTY Statute states “extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property, not justify by military necessity and carried 
out unlawfully and wantonly” are war crimes40. Thus, making an a contrario 
interpretation this means that military necessity might justify such acts. Until today 
such a provision has not allowed any war criminal to find any defence in case of war 
crimes. In the Hostages case, the United States Military Tribunal rejected the defence 
of military necessity to war crimes and stated “The rules of international law must be 
followed even if it results in the loss of a battle or even a war. Expediency or 
necessity cannot warrant their violation.”41 The same Tribunal has also rejected such 
a defence in the High Command case and declared the acceptance of this defence 
“would eliminate all humanity and decency and all law from the conduct of war and 
it is a contention which this Tribunal repudiates as contrary to the accepted usages of 
civilized nations.”42 In doing so the Tribunal clearly stated that such military 
necessity does includes the right of doing anything that contributes to winning the 
war. More recently, such an issue was raised in the trial of Kordic & Cerkez before 
the Trial Chamber of the ICTY.
43
 Mostly based on the interpretation of the Rome 
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Statute, the judges highlighted that in case of war crimes; the principle of military 
necessity must be appreciated in relation to the requirement that the act of defence 
must be “proportionate to the degree of danger”. The Trial Chamber‟s conclusion 
concerning this defence based on military necessity was „that military operations in 
self-defence do not provide a justification for serious violations of humanitarian 
law.‟44 This specific part of the definition of self-defence must be seen as part of the 
acknowledgement of military necessity, which is not new in international criminal 
law. In 1954, Glaser wrote that the construction of international criminal law has 
evolved based on a compromise between military exigencies and the aspiration for 
justice.
45
 In this regards the Statute fulfil its task as the Statute imposes some 
restrictions as to the invocation of self-defence. First the Statute insists that self-
defence is evocable only if it takes place during a legal operation.
46
 This excludes for 
example, that such a defence may justify the practice of „human shield‟ as article 8 of 
the Statute states that such practice is a war crime, thus illegal.
47
 David was 
concerned about the fact that self-defence could have been a successful defence in 
case of the use of a „human shield‟ to protect some property essential for the 
accomplishment of a military operation.
48
 The Statute also adds that „the fact that the 
person was involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces shall not in itself 
constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility.‟ A second restriction to 
such defence adds that such a defence is not valid in case of the use of force by the 
state.
49
 Thus, when the principle of public policy (‘raison d’état’) is invoked the rule 
of public international law will be applicable. There will be a distinction between the 
military necessity invoked by an individual which represents the engagement of the 
person in the conflict as such person also has an interest in the victory, and the 
military necessities claimed by the state.  
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IV. DURESS 
 
Most national criminal systems admit that criminal responsibility disappears when a 
person acts in circumstances which have effectively remove the possibility of 
exercising his or her free will by the effect of a threat to him/her or to a relative. This 
defence is often call „necessity‟, „compulsion‟, or „coercion‟.50 On the nuances 
between these notions, Professor Hall has stated: 
 
There are valid grounds in support of the above noted differences between 
the doctrines of necessity and coercion. In the former, the pressure which 
influences the action is physical nature, while coercion it is the immoral and 
illegal conduct of human beings that create the problem.
51
  
 
Some legal systems include the two different types of compulsion under the general 
term of „necessity‟. The Statute establishes the same link between coercion by 
another person and compulsion by the circumstances.
52
 The common law regime 
excludes this defence as a complete defence in cases of „the most serious crimes‟, 
such as murder, treason, piracy or sexual assault.
53
 Such a position is based on the 
fact that duress is justified by the idea that the accused has avoided a greater harm, 
thus it does not apply when an individual, to save his or her own life has killed 
another person. In most of the civil law systems such a defence is admissible.
54
 
 
Duress, necessity, and superior order  
 
At the international level, prior to the Rome Statute, the defence of duress was often 
linked with the plea of superior orders, and such a defence was considered more as a 
mitigating factor than as a complete defence. The defence of duress was used several 
times during the trials following the Second World War. The term used for such 
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defence was „necessity‟.55 In the Krupp Trial the judges affirmed that necessity is a 
defence „when it is shown that the act charged was done to avoid an evil severe and 
irreparable; that there was no other adequate means of escape; and that the remedy 
was not disproportioned to the evil.”56 In the Einsazgruppen case, the U.S. Military 
Tribunal stated: 
 
(...) there is no law which requires that an innocent man must forfeit his life 
or suffer serious harm in order to avoid committing a crime which he 
condemns…No Court will punish a man who, with a loaded pistol at his 
head, is compelled to pull a lethal lever.
57
  
 
Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter excluded the defence of superior orders, but it 
was interpreted by the Tribunal that such a defence, if linked with „absence of moral 
choice‟, was acceptable as a defence.58 This was based on the idea that the defence of 
superior orders might include some situations in which the accused argues that the 
consequences of disobedience might constitute a direct threat to his or her physical 
integrity, that is to be related to the defence of duress as this defence covers situations 
in which the accused acted under an immediate threat.  Nevertheless, the distinction 
between the two different defences remained clear. Even though they were often 
pleaded together, the judgement in High Command Case explained the distinction: 
 
The defendants in this case who received obviously criminal orders were 
placed in a difficult position, but servile compliance with orders clearly 
criminal for fear of some disadvantage or punishment not immediately 
threatened cannot be recognised as a defence. To establish the defence of 
coercion or necessity in the face of danger there must be a showing of 
circumstances such that a reasonable man would apprehended that he was in 
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such imminent physical peril as to deprive him of freedom to choose the 
right and refrain from the wrong.
59
 
 
Nevertheless, the plea of superior orders without a link with coercion was not found 
admissible, an approach that was confirmed by one of the majority judges at the 
ICTY in the trial of Erdemovic.
60
 The Rome Statute clearly distinguishes between the 
plea of obedience to superior orders and duress and thus codifies such a difference. 
There is a specific provision in article 33 of the ICC statute concerning superior 
orders. The plea of duress refers to a “threat of imminent death or of continuing or 
imminent bodily harm”, whether the threat comes from a superior or not.  
 
Duress as a factor in mitigation only?  
 
A fundamental difference between international criminal law following the Second 
World War and international criminal law as codified within the Rome Statute relates 
to the consequences of the defence of duress. The Rome Statute includes the plea of 
duress as a factor for the exclusion of the criminal responsibility, whereas the post 
world war tribunals used this defence as a factor of mitigation. One of the clearest 
decision in that regard comes from the Hölzer Case before a Canadian Military Court 
in 1946, the Judge stated: “there is no doubt on these authorities that compulsion is a 
defence when the crime is not of a heinous character. But the killing of an innocent 
can never be justified.”61 In conclusion, the judge stated that duress could only be a 
factor in mitigation of the punishment.
62
 During the post second world war trials, the 
only cases where the defence of duress was accepted as a complete defence were the 
cases of Flick, I.G. Farben and Krupp. In these cases the accused were some German 
industrialists charged with employing forced labour. Their defence was mainly based 
on the fact that if they did not reach the quota required by the government, which was 
only possible by using forced labour supplied by the government, they would have 
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suffered „harmful and irresistible consequences‟. The judges admitted this defence 
only because the crime of employing forced labour was not considered a heinous one. 
The ICTY reached the same conclusion in the Erdemovic case. As a member of a 
firing squad, Drazen Erdemovic was involved in the killing of unarmed civilians that 
followed the fall of the United Nations so-called „safe area‟ of Srebrenica.63 When 
the accused has pleaded guilty for crime against humanity, he declared:  
 
Your honour, I had to do this. If I had refused, I would have been killed 
together with the victims. When I refused, they told me: „If you are sorry for 
them, stand up, line up with them and we will kill you too.‟ I am not sorry 
for myself but for my family, my wife and son who then had nine months, 
and I could not refuse because then they would have killed me.
64
 
 
The Statute of the ICTY makes no mention of the defence of duress, thus, in that case 
the judges had to look back on the precedents in international criminal law and in the 
national legislations. The Trial Chamber of the ICTY stated:  
 
With regard to a crime against humanity, the Trial Chamber considers that 
the life of the accused and that of the victim are not fully equivalent. As 
opposed to ordinary law, the violation here is no longer directed at the 
physical welfare of the victim alone but at humanity as a whole.
65
  
 
The Trial Chamber rejected the plea based on duress and the accused was sentenced 
to ten years imprisonment.
66
 On appeal, in a 3:2 decision, the judges concluded: 
“duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against 
humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings.”67 As 
the accused pleaded the defence of duress, a fundamental issue was to define whether 
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the plea of the appellant was equivocal. The judges‟ opinions stress that the question 
whether the appellant‟s plea was equivocal depended on whether duress can be 
afforded as a complete defence. According to judges Vohrah, McDonald and Li, 
duress might be considered as a mitigating factor.
68
 Judge Stephen in his separate and 
dissenting opinion based his dissent on the fact that the accused had pleaded guilty 
because of the possibility to plead duress as a ground to exclude his criminal liability. 
Thus, for judge Stephen, the guilty plea was not unambiguous and was equivocal. 
The conclusion of judge Stephen on the application of duress as a complete defence 
in international law is:  
 
The stringent conditions always surrounding that defence will have to be 
met, including the requirement that the harm done is not disproportionate to 
the harm threatened. The case of an accused, forced to take innocent lives 
which he cannot save and who can only add to the toll by the sacrifice of his 
own life, is entirely consistent with that requirement.
69
 
 
In his dissenting opinion, the president of the Appeals Chamber, judge Cassese, 
highlighted the fact that in international criminal law “duress may generally be urged 
as a defence, provided certain strict requirements are met; when it cannot be admitted 
as a defence, duress may nevertheless be acted upon as a mitigation circumstance.”70 
The definition of duress used by Judge Cassese is clear on that issue: “Duress, 
namely acting under a threat from a third person of severe and irreparable harm to 
life or limb, entails that no criminal responsibility is incurred by the person acting 
under that threat.”71 Cassese based his reflections on the same precedents as the other 
judges but arrived at the conclusion that: 
 
(...) with regard to war crimes or crimes against humanity whose underlying 
offences is murder or more generally the taking of life, no special rule of 
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customary international law has evolved on the matter, consequently, even 
with respect to these offences the general rule on duress applies; it follows 
that duress may amount to a defence provided that its stringent requirements 
are met. 
 
The Trial Chamber that pronounced the second sentencing judgement in 1998 
reaffirms the ruling used by the appeals chamber that duress can be taken into 
account only by way of mitigation, but the chamber specified that in this case “there 
was a real risk that the accused would have been killed had he disobeyed the order. 
He voiced his feelings, but realised that he had no choice in the matter: he had to kill 
or be killed.”72 This fact was certainly one of the factors which reduced the sentence 
of the accused to five years. However, as this decision ruled in favour of duress as a 
matter of mitigation by a 3:2 majority only, this decision from the ICTY also pointed 
out the lack of a clear cut rule in international criminal law to answer the question of 
duress as a complete defence. Thus, to some extent the door was left open when the 
diplomats went to Rome to discuss the issue. This was done as the Rome Statute 
clearly overrules the decision of the majority in Erdemovic case.  
 
The codification of duress by the Rome Statute 
 
Article 31 (1) (d) classifies duress as a ground to exclude criminal responsibility. 
Thus duress is admissible as a complete defence. In this regard, the Rome Statue is 
clearly an evolution in comparison to the previous rules of international criminal law. 
It is worth noting that in the Rome Statute duress is admissible for all the crimes 
„within the jurisdiction of the Court‟; thus such defence is admissible in case of 
genocide even though if this crime is considered as „the crime of crimes‟.73 To 
understand such evolution it is crucial to focus on the three specific requirements that 
are included in the statute. In this regards, the Rome Statute operates more as 
codification rather than an alteration from international jurisprudence. On the 
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requirements, Article 31 (1) (d) states that duress should result „from a threat of 
imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person 
or another person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, 
provided that the person does not intend to cause greater harm than the one sought to 
be avoided.‟ Thus, the defence must be based on „necessity‟, „reasonability‟ and 
„proportionality‟, thus the statute insures that the “stringent requirements are met.” 
 
(a) “The stringent requirement” 
 
Necessity and Reasonability 
 
To invoke duress, the accused must have been in a situation where he/she was 
absolutely unable to act in conformity with the law. The accused must have 
undergone a considerable pressure; the doctrine uses the term „irresistible duress‟. In 
the Krupp Trial the judges stated: 
 
“(...) the question is to be determined from the standpoint of the honest 
belief of the particular accused  in question…The effect of the alleged 
compulsion is to be determined not by objective but by subjective standards. 
Moreover, as in the case of self-defence, the mere fact that such danger was 
present is not sufficient. There must be an actual bona fide belief in danger 
by the particular individual.”74   
 
The Krupp Trial pointed out that “the will of the accused be not thereby over-
powered but instead coincides with the will of those from whom the alleged 
compulsion emanates, there is no necessity justifying the illegal conduct.”75 This 
condition also refers to the fact that there must be no disproportion between the 
criminal act and the gravity of the threat. Thus, the fact that „the person does not 
intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided‟ within the Statute 
has to be seen as a codification of the practice of the judges in the matter of plea of 
duress. Such a requirement is certainly an answer to those who were afraid that the 
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inclusion of the defence of duress within the Rome Statute would be a denial to the 
recognition of the specific gravity of the crimes that are under the competence of the 
ICC. For example, it is on such a requirement that the Trial Chamber of the ICTY 
rejected the defence of duress as a ground to exclude the criminal intention. In its 
judgement the Chamber concluded that “proof of the specific circumstances which 
would fully exonerate the accused of his responsibility has not been provided” and 
therefore such a defence would have “been taken into account at the same time as 
other factors in the consideration of mitigating circumstances”76. 
 
The notion of „reasonability‟ is also widely accepted. It refers to the idea that 
everybody in the same situation would have feared the danger. There must be some 
circumstances that prove that a „reasonable person‟ would have felt an imminent 
physical peril that would have deprived him of his faculty of choice. Traditionally, 
this notion of „reasonability‟ refers to three ideas. The accused must have reasonably 
believed in the existence of the threat, he must have had some reasons to believe that 
such a threat would have been executed and finally the accused must have been 
reasonably brave
77
. 
 
Proportionality 
 
In the Rome Statute, the requirement of proportionality comes from the sentence: 
“provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought 
to be avoided”. It is obvious that such a requirement seriously narrows the fear that 
some have expressed during the drafting of the Statute that such defence will 
“violate(s) the literal language of the criminal law.”78 Judge Cassese in his dissenting 
opinion in the Erdemovic case explained: “this requirement cannot normally be met 
with respect to offences involving the killing of innocents, since it is impossible to 
balance one life against another”. Nevertheless, Cassese added: “in exceptional 
circumstances this requirement might be met, for example, when the killing would be 
in any case perpetrated by persons other than the one acting under duress.” Thus, in 
this case the question is not only to save ones own life by the killing of another 
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person, “but of simply saving your own life when the other person will inevitably die, 
which may not be „disproportionate‟ as a remedy.”79 
 
(b) Duress of circumstances 
 
The Rome Statute brings an interesting contribution to international law by allowing 
the defence of duress based on the circumstances of the act. The Rome Statute 
recognises the threat against the accused might have been „„constituted by other 
circumstances beyond that person‟s control.” That subparagraph establishes a link 
between the traditional distinction between the defence of duress (threat created by 
another person) and the defence of necessity (the conduct was justified by the general 
circumstances of the act). During the post second world war trials there was some 
reference to such defence. In the Statton case it was said: “When a man is absolutely, 
by natural necessity, forced, his will does not go along with the act.”80 Even though, it 
is not specifically mentioned in the Rome Statute, there is a clear limitation on the 
admissibility of the duress of circumstances.
81
 It is clear from the precedents in 
international criminal law that when the accused put himself voluntary in the 
circumstances that have created the threat to his life, the defence of duress is not 
acceptable.  For example, Article 9 of the Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, in the case 
in which the Tribunal has recognized the criminal character of one organisation, any 
individual who has joined such criminal organisation can be presumed responsible of 
his/her acts within such organisation.
82
 This article highlighted the fact that the 
international criminal justice takes into account the subjective element that result of 
the knowledge of the methods and purposes of a group or an organisation as a factor 
of individual criminal responsibility when a person has deliberately adhered to such 
group. This was discussed in the Einsatzgruppen or the „Milch‟ cases.83 In a 1949 
case, two accused who had been active members of the National-Socialist Party 
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during the „crystal night‟ in 1938 had claimed during their trial that they acted under 
duress. The German Supreme Court dismissed such defence and stated:  
 
As an old member of the Party, T. knew the programme and the fighting 
methods of the NSDAP (Nazi Party). (...) in this condition of necessity for 
which he himself was to blame, could he have benefited from a possible 
misapprehension of the circumstances that could have misled him as to the 
condition of necessity or compulsion.
84
  
 
Recently, in 1993, a French Court of Appeal in the Touvier case confirmed such a 
rule.
85
 Concerning the defence based on the necessity created by the circumstances of 
the crimes, the Court stated: 
 
 No justification, be it founded on the state of necessity or on the defence of 
a third party, can be legitimately invoked by an official of the Militia such as 
Touvier, by virtue of his office, was naturally under the obligation to satisfy 
the requirements of the Nazi authorities. The very nature of this occupation, 
which he freely chose, implied regular cooperation with operations such as 
the SD or the Gestapo.
86
  
 
In his dissenting opinion in the Erdemovic case, Judge Cassese emphasised that:  
 
According to the case-law on international humanitarian law, duress or 
necessity cannot excuse from criminal responsibility the person who intends 
to avail himself of such defence if he freely and knowingly chose to become 
a member of a unit, organisation or group institutionally intent upon actions 
contrary to international criminal law. 
87
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Thus, the reference within the Rome Statute “beyond that person‟s control” must be 
read in conjunction with these precedents in international criminal law. If the person 
has deliberately chosen to be part of an organisation or a group which clearly was for 
the commission of act of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, a defence 
based on duress of circumstances would certainly be rejected by the ICC. As Knoops 
concluded: “[T]he rationale for the defense of duress is ultimately based in the 
disabling of the accused from achieving a culpable state of mind.”88  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In conclusion, the Rome Statute is a very accomplished codification of the most 
equitable human justice possible. A priorir the requirements of the statute are clear 
and define what is necessary to establish the good balance required for human justice. 
This Statute must been seen as the codification of a very ancient reflection on the 
defences admissible in case of criminal offences. It is important to remember that one 
of the first revolutions in terms of respect for human rights was the codification of 
criminal offences and defences in order to protect the individual against the partiality 
and the sole power of the state and the judges.
89
 We have to remember that: “law is 
based on what society can reasonably expect of its members. It should not set 
intractable standards of behaviour which require mankind to perform acts of 
martyrdom, and brand as criminal any behaviour falling below those standards.”90 
The Rome Statute must also be seen as an accomplishment of the declaration made in 
1948 in article 11 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human rights: “Everyone 
charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees 
necessary for his defence.” Thus, even though the evolution towards prosecution for 
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deterrence and prevention of the worst crimes is certainly one of the most positive 
evolutions of the last decade, one should not forget the human rights face of criminal 
law. In this regard, the new mantra of human rights activist for prosecution only is a 
dangerous evolution. The Statute has succeeded in finding a balance between the 
necessity to punish the worst criminal and respecting the fundamental rights of the 
human beings when facing the human justice.  
 
Even with the codification of the defences in case of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, the balancing between one life and the life of several 
innocents will always be the most perilous part of the human justice. As Bassiouni 
comments: “Even at the risk of one‟s life, how can necessity justify or excuse the 
taking of multiples lives.”91 Finally, even though, the Rome Statute codifies the 
„ground to exclude the criminal responsibility‟, however, the list contains in Article 
31 is not exhaustive, paragraph 3 refers to Article 21 which provides that the Court 
shall apply in first place the provisions of the Statute, and “in second place, where 
appropriate, the principles and the rules of international law”, and “falling that, 
general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of 
the world.”92 Thus, the admissible ground to exclude the criminal responsibility are 
not „frozen‟, which is good as each personal case could be different than the framing 
created by the Rome Statute. 
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